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In this paper we introduce the Logic and Law corner of this journal. We will discuss a
number of ways in which logic has been used in AI and Law, and give some of the
key references to previous work on these topics. We will also list some important
questions which we see as ready for further exploration. We encourage contributions
on these, and other, Logic and Law issues.
1. Logic and law
The purpose of this paper is to provide an introduction for the Logic and Law corner
of this journal. Law is of vital importance, touching the lives of all people. The effect
of law also matters a great deal, and the costs of mistakes can be serious. In order to
comply with the law it must be understood by those it affects, and to be accepted it
must be explained in terms that are comprehensible by those to whom they are
addressed. Moreover, the law must be applied in a way which is transparent and
accountable. Clearly computer systems can assist with all these aspects, but they
require clarity of meaning and soundness of reasoning: hence the importance of logic
for law.
In the early days of the application of logic to the law there were some simplistic
expectations: that it would be enough to represent the law as a logical theory and to
deduce the consequences of that theory. This view proved too narrow, for the
reasons we will discuss in this paper. We will identify some key uses of logic in law,
by briefly describing some prominent historical work, mentioning some key papers
reflecting the state of the art and finally pointing to some of the main current issues
which we hope will be addressed by papers that will appear in this corner. We will see
that the need to address problems arising from applying logic to the law has driven
developments in logic and reasoning and has also provided a significant test of logical
techniques in general. From a brief initial overview of the history of logic in AI and
law we will identify three chief roles for logic, a shift in their relative importance, and
an associated broadened conception of logic.
The original use of logic in law was for representation of law in a clear and
unambiguous manner. In these approaches, reasoning was seen as simply deduction
from the resulting formal representation. This conception, adopting a narrow, Fregean,
view of logic, sees reasoning as following from representation: once the meaning of
the concepts has been formalised, the notion of valid inference follows automatically,
so that the main task is to develop sound and complete proof procedures. In other
words: representing the law comes first; the reasoning follows from it and can be done
within a traditional conception of logic. This approach was popularised in [45], which
showed the strengths of the approach by applying it to a piece of new legislation in
which issues of interpretation were minimised, but the success here was not readily
transferable to other areas.
Attempts to build on this work led to the realisation that many aspects of legal
reasoning go beyond the semantics of traditional logical approaches. When a law is
framed, the legislators are well aware that they cannot envisage all the circumstances
in which it will be applied. Typically they will enunciate a general norm, capturing
the essence of the proposed measure, and then qualify this with a series of exceptions.
Furthermore they use abstract concepts, intended to be interpreted in the light of the
concrete facts of the cases that are brought before the court. This leads to uncertainty
and disagreement, in situations moreover, where there are inevitably conflicts of
interest. Therefore, to apply to law, the logic must be robust in the face of exceptions,
conflicting rules, vagueness, and open texture and recognise the possibility of rational
disagreement.
Some of these features primarily led to innovations in approaches to reasoning, others
made it necessary to consider context, procedure, interaction and other dynamic
aspects. The need to handle these features has also led to a broader (non-Fregean)
conception of logic. This is essentially a special case of a general development in
logic. For instance, [15] speaks (in addition to a computational turn) of first a
cognitive turn in logic, in which greater interest is paid how reasoning is actually
practiced and then an interactive turn, in which the reasoning is considered in the
context of the behaviour of intelligent agents engaged in social interaction, with
meaning emerging from these communicative exchanges.
We will address these three aspects of logic and law in turn. Logic for representation
will be discussed in section 2, logic for modelling reasoning in section 3, and logic for
modelling interaction in section 4. Section 5 identifies some important topics for
future exploration, and section 6 offers a brief conclusion.
2. Representation
This section will discuss several aspects of the use of logic to represent law.
A very early use of logic was to provide a systematic way of revealing syntactic
ambiguities in legislation [4]. Legal drafters, for example often use “if”
indiscriminately, sometimes expressing only a sufficient condition, but at other times
expressing a necessary and sufficient condition. Often these variant readings will
interact, giving rise to a very large number of possible interpretations of the text (e.g.
[5]).
Many sentences in law express norms, and therefore contain terms like “may”, “must”
and “shall”. Deontic logic attempts to provide formal tools for the clarification of the
meaning of these terms, and so it is unsurprising that deontic logic has been used in
theanalysis of law (e.g. [1], [29] and [24]). It became clear that an important aspect
here is the normative positions and legal relations that follow from these norms ([25],
[44] and [42]). Normative positions exhaustively specify how a particular action of a
particular agent is regulated. For instance, our normative position with respect to
writing this article is that we are permitted but not obliged to write it and permitted
but not obliged not to write it. Legal relations express the normative expectations of
one agent with respect to another and how the agents can change these. Contracts are
an important source of legal relations and therefore the modelling of legal relations
has especially been studied in the area of automated contract management (see e.g.
[16]).
Since norms regulate behaviour and prescribe sanctions for those that violate them,
notions of agency, responsibility, causation are required to articulate what it is to
comply with and to violate norms. These notions have been widely discussed in
philosophical logic and practical philosophy, but have received relatively little
attention in AI and Law (but see [49]).
Time and change also have considerable importance in law. Law is subject to
amendment, and so we must recognise the norms that are in force at a given time.
Actions and events modify legal relations and normative positions, and so these must
also be capable of dynamic assignment. Time is also important as it is frequently used
as part of conditions in norms. There is some AI and Law work on time and change,
applying the event calculus [23] or defeasible logic [20] but much more can be done.
A good overview of the issues and possible approaches is given by [47].
Change in law can also be studied abstracting from time, as in belief revision. In fact,
one of the papers that gave birth to belief revision, [2], applied the idea of belief
revision to the legal problem of determining the result of derogations of norms.
However, this work has had little follow up from others within logic and law.
A topic related to time and change is that of specifying legal and organisational
procedures. The law often prescribes sequences of actions which must be followed to
achieve a certain legal effect. For example, application for a benefit requires that the
claimant and the adjudicator perform a series of actions in a prescribed order within
certain time constraints for the claim to be effective. Other examples of legal
procedures are complaint procedures, elections, audit procedures, decision-making
procedures, and so on. Also, organisations often design their own procedures in order
to comply with the law. (One can even think of the general procedures for court
proceedings but since, as we will explain below, these are intimately linked with the
notion of reasoning, we will discuss them in a separate section.) Formal specification
of legal and compliance procedures has many practical applications but is so far a
largely neglected topic in AI and Law, except for some initial work by, for instance,
[31] on voting procedures, [19] on auction and negotiation procedures and [3] on
verifying compliance procedures.
A first challenge for ‘traditional’ conceptions of logic is posed by several structural
features of legal regulations [8]. These include the use of exceptions; the use of
hierarchies of legislation to resolve conflicts between different regulations; cross
references to other parts of legislation; deeming provisions (such as when a healthy
but pregnant teacher is deemed to be ill when there is an outbreak of rubella in her
school,entitling her to claim sickness benefit); conditions under which the legislation
is applicable; and conditions for the validity of particular norms. The first uses of non-
monotonic logics in AI and Law were to address these features (see [38] for an
overview).
However, it was soon realised that ‘standard’ nonmonotonic logics have limited
applicability and this led to considerations that take us beyond representation and into
reasoning (the cognitive turn). While some of the challenges thrown up by law can be
met by adapting or extending the logic, others seem to require that the context and
content be considered in order to reach resolution. Originally, use of nonmonotonic
logics kept rules at the centre of attention. Despite the identification of several
principles for resolving conflicts between rules (for example, preferring the most
recent, the most specific or the hierarchically most important) these principles proved
inadequate to provide a general means of conflict resolution. Such general principles
often only apply to certain categories of rules (those just mentioned only apply to
statutory regulations, although there are some analogous principles relating to case
law, where decisions of higher courts may be binding on lower courts), they are
defeasible themselves, and they may themselves conflict. More often, conflicts arise
not from competing norms, but from the variety of ways in which they can be
interpreted. As noted above, law contains terms intended to be closed by court
decisions in the light of particular cases, and this has often led to conflicting
interpretations. At the very least, this gives rise to a need to represent case law as a
source of interpretations. However, simply representing the decisions made in
precedent cases as a rule is not enough since a new case will rarely exactly match the
precedent, so that techniques for handling conflicting rules fall short. Moreover
decisions can typically be represented at a number of different levels of abstraction,
making the precise formulation of such a rule controversial. This recognition
contributed to the shift of focus from representation to an exploration of modes of
reasoning, such as analogy, case-based reasoning and theory construction.
In the next section we will briefly recall some of the techniques which have been used
in AI and Law in response to these problems.
3. Reasoning
The problems identified at the end of the last section led to several broader accounts
of legal inference. Some remained within the spirit of ‘standard’ nonmonotonic logic.
For instance, [17] and [36] modelled dialectical argumentation with rules, embedding
standard techniques for handling exceptions and rule conflicts in inference procedures
modelled as games. Hage and Verheij (e.g. [21]) developed reason-based logic, which
puts the notion of reasons at the centre: reasoning is modelled as the construction and
weighing of competing reasons, and rules are merely one source of reasons, which
have to weighed against competing reasons. Reason-based logic also provides
sophisticated accounts of what it means to apply a rule, and of the difference between
legal rules and legal principles [46]. In all of this work one concern has been the
modelling of reasoning about preference criteria, acknowledging the fact that reliable
general conflict-resolution principles cannot be given.
CaseBased Reasoning
As explained above, one often needs to look at decisions in individual cases to see
how conflicts have been resolved in particular contexts with respect to the content of
the conflicting norms. These decisions will tell us what considerations are relevant to
given conflicts. In case-based reasoning one goes further and attempts to use
particular cases to show how these considerations justify particular outcomes in these
cases. As discussed above, the main challenge here is to cope with the fact that a new
case rarely exactly matches a precedent. In AI and Law several influential
computational models of case-based legal reasoning have been developed (see [40]
for an overview) The logical formalisation of these models was addressed in e.g. [27],
[28] and [37]. Initially, this work attempted to extend the dialectical procedures for
rule-based reasoning to case-based reasoning. Later, these procedures were combined
with models of practical reasoning and theory formation.
Practical and Teleological Reasoning
Some legal decisions involve the exercise of discretion: the arbiter can choose what
the resolution shall be. Often there will be reasons presented on both sides of an
argument, and it is the role of the judge to choose which should prevail. The choice,
however, needs to be justified so that it can be seen as acceptable to higher courts, and
perhaps to the public at large (see [13], Ch. 10). Justification of choices is the domain
of practical reasoning. Examples of such reasoning can be found in AI and Law: in
particular, attention has been paid to the justification of choices in terms of the
underlying purpose of the law, or so as to achieve the most desirable consequences
([7], [22]).
Theory Formation
A long standing view of legal reasoning (e.g. [30]) is that it should be seen as
constructing a theory to explain the decisions made in the past. This view was revived
more recently by [9], which offered a detailed account of what constitutes a theory
intended to explain a body of case law, and how such theories could be constructed
from givens (facts, precedents). This approach has also been the subject of a number
of computational experiments in [12] to assess the quality of legal theories
constructed from a set of givens in US Trade Secrets law.
Reasoning about evidence
Most of what has been said above pertains to normative issues: to the classification of
the facts of a case under legal concepts, to the interpretation of these concepts, and to
the derivation of normative consequences from these classifications and
interpretations. In fact, most AI and Law research takes the facts of the cases as
givens. However, in the practice of law, cases are mostly about establishing the facts
and therefore logic will not fully serve the law if it does not address the modelling of
reasoning about evidence. At first sight it might be thought that this can be left to
statistics and probability theory, but, for various reasons, there is a place for logic here.
In legal cases the numbers required by statistics are often not available so that
qualitative reasoning models must be used. Even when numbers are available, the
statistical evidence can be criticised in many ways (e.g. were the data collected in a
sound way, does the statistical model correctly model the problem, is the conclusion
drawn from the statistics warranted) so that the use of statistical evidence must be
embedded in more general models of legal argumentation.
Thereis some initial work on evidential reasoning in AI and Law. For instance, in [11]
Bex et al. have formalised an argument-based approach by combining an argument-
based nonmonotonic logic with the argument-scheme approach (see below), while in
[32] Poole has illustrated how a scenario-based approach to reasoning about evidence
can be modelled as abductive reasoning in his Theorist system. In [10] Bex et al try to
combine the argument- and scenario-based approaches. However, much more remains
to be done, especially on the integration with statistical methods.
We end with a brief discussion of two more general formal techniques that have been
used in AI and Law to model legal reasoning.
Argument Schemes
Taking inspiration from work in informal logic such as [48], a number of the above
problems have been addressed using argument schemes, e.g. [33]. Argument schemes
are stereotypical patterns of reasoning, and can be more or less domain specific.
Argument schemes establish a presumption in favour of their claim, which must be
defended against a critique made using so-called critical questions that are
characteristic of the particular scheme. An example of an argument scheme for
evidential reasoning is If a witness says that P then P. Three critical questions of this
scheme are: is the witness sincere, was the witness in the position to observe P and
does the witness correctly remember it? An argument scheme for practical reasoning
is I want to achieve G, doing A will achieve G, so I should do A. Among the critical
questions associated with this scheme are: will doing A achieve G? are there better
ways to achieve G? will doing A also have undesirable consequences?
In AI and Law explicit use of argument schemes has been made by e.g. [11] in the
context of evidential reasoning and by e.g. [7] in the context of practical reasoning.
Prakken [33] argues that much AI and Law work implicitly adopts the argument
scheme approach.
Argumentation Frameworks
One development in logic and AI which has had considerable influence in law is the
introduction of argumentation frameworks by Dung [14] His approach, originally
intended as a unifying theory of nonmonotonic logic and logic programming, is
entirely abstract, a framework comprising a set of arguments and a binary attack
relation between them. The acceptability of an argument is then considered relative to
a subset of arguments in the framework able to defend it against its attackers. In law
this basic idea has been adapted in a number of ways. For instance, in [36] Prakken
and Sartor have instantiated Dung’s abstract approach by making the notions of
argument and attack more structured and by showing how reasoning about the rule
priorities that determine the attack relations can also be captured within the
framework. Bench-Capon e.g. [7] has introduced the notion of the value promoted by
the acceptance of an argument, which allows for a general distinction between attacks
and successful attacks based on a preference ordering of these values, so as to express
legal teleological reasoning.
4. Interaction
The need for legal reasoning mostly arises in the context of a conflict between
different parties, decided within a prescribed legal procedure for conflict resolution.
This means that legal reasoning typically takes the form of a dialogical exchange of
arguments representing the alternative views, followed by a reasoned justification for
adopting one of the views rather than the other. The conduct of the dispute will be
regulated by procedures appropriate to the particular form of dispute, and the
justification of the outcome will depend on these procedures having been followed.
An important insight here is that, given a set of facts and a body of law, the outcome
may depend on the procedures that must be followed. This means that we cannot
abstract the reasoning from the context of the dispute to identify the proper
conclusions: it is intertwined with the procedures being followed (see also [26]).
Several examples can be cited. It may be that the outcome in otherwise identical cases
may depend on which party is assigned the burden of proof. It may be that the finding
will be different if it is a civil proceedings rather than a criminal proceedings since the
standard of proof for the attribution of guilt is lower. (This happened in the case of
O.J. Simpson, who was first acquitted in a criminal case and then held liable in a civil
case.) It may be that evidence that is admissible in one jurisdiction will be disallowed
in another.
We are therefore required to consider the procedures which enable the determination
of such questions as who has the burden of proof for each subquestion, whether
particular pieces of argument and evidence are admissible, when it is proper to reach a
decision, the standard of proof expected for particular subquestions.
Moreover, the facts are not given at the outset of the case. Although there may be
points of agreement between the two parties, other facts, and explanatory theories,
will emerge and be constructed as the case proceeds.
Acknowledging these observations, AI and Law has in the last fifteen years produced
a number of dialogue game models of legal procedure, adapting techniques from so-
called ‘formal dialectics’ in philosophical logic and argumentation theory. This
started with Tom Gordon’s [17] computational model of a (rationally reconstructed)
particular legal procedure, the American procedure of civil pleading. Subsequent
work has focussed more on idealised procedures. This AI and law work is similar in
style to (mostly later) work in multi-agent systems on modelling dialogues involving
argumentation. A recent overview of both strands of work is given in [35]. In addition
to this work on dialogue games, there is some work on the role of burden of proof in
legal reasoning and legal procedure (e.g. [18], [39] and [43]).
5. Some Important Topics for Investigation
We now discuss what we think are some of the most important current issues in logic




A main concern with respect to representation has been the growth of interest in
ontologies. So far in AI and Law, the ontologies used have been predominantly
thesaurus or taxonomy style ontologies, targeted at applications such as information
retrieval and inter-language understanding. Elsewhere in AI, advances have been
made in more sophisticated ontologies, formulated in description logics. There seems
to be considerable scope for these techniques to be introduced into the legal domain:
those norms which serve to define legal concepts would appear to be an ideal subject
for description logics. Moreover, in so far as many other norms are concerned with
classification into legal concepts, description logics may be of wider application. The
role for description logics in logic and law is still largely unaddressed.
Action, time and change; procedures
A recurrent problem in representation in AI is law is the representation of action, time
and change: whether we are thinking about changes to the law itself or changes in
legal relations consequent upon the actions of the parties concerned. Outside of AI
and Law, there are active communities working on logics of action, time and change
and it would be interesting to see the fruits of this research applied to the legal domain.
Legal and compliance procedures seem particularly suited for formalisation in
temporal and action logics, while model-checking techniques might be applied to their
formal verification. The highly important topic of regulatory compliance, in particular,
is intimately bound up with these issues.
5.2 Reasoning
Reasoning about evidence
Reasoning about evidence is a topic which has had no more than a preliminary
exploration thus far. Possible lines of development include: extension of the argument
scheme approach for evidential reasoning (for instance, to the handling of statistical
evidence); extension of the scenario-based approach; further integration of these
approaches and with integration with purely statistical approaches.
Practical reasoning
Practical reasoning is another topic at which the law could profit from active research
communities outside the law. The justification of choices made in the course of
problem solving has been explored in the context of agent systems. The topic is also
important in law and so there is ample scope for the transfer of this work to the legal
domain. Other work in the multi-agent system area looks at making choices
constrained by social laws. Again this notion of what it is to comply with the law is of
relevance to law, in legal planning systems and systems directed at regulatory
compliance.
Combining modes of reasoning
Addressing a legal problem typically involves a number of different modes of
reasoning: at least evidential reasoning, case-based, classificatory, and sometimes
practical reasoning when a choice needs to be made. Integrating these different modes
of reasoning and managing the transition from one to another in the course of solving
a legal problem is as yet largely unexplored.
Accrual of arguments
Where several arguments for a given claim exist, there are questions of how they
should be combined to reflect their collective strength. Since legal arguments, like
arguments in many other fields, are often persuasive rather than coercive, situations in
which the combined effect of several arguments pro and con a position need to be
considered are frequently encountered. In such circumstances the possibility arises
that an argument is defeated by several arguments taken together, even though each is
individually weaker. The circumstances under which arguments can accrue, and
mechanisms to allow accrual are needed to address this problem. Some preliminary
attempts to capture accrual exist (e.g. [34]), but there is much more to be done.
Argument schemes
Argument schemes have provided a fruitful way of exploring certain questions, but
the approach has by no means exhausted its utility. Work here will include both the
detailed exploration of particular schemes and their associated questions, and general
exploration of the role of schemes in reasoning and dialogue.
5.3 Interaction
Investigating procedures for resolving conflicts and disputes
As indicated above, AI and Law has modelled procedures for resolving conflicts and
disputes for many years Such models have been formal to greater and lesser extents,
but even in the more formal cases little attention has been paid to proving their
properties, for example whether the procedure is guaranteed to terminate, or whether
it gives a ‘fair’ opportunity to the parties to express their own and attack the other
parties’ views. In other fields there is more systematic investigation of procedures.
For example, in the context of multi-agent systems procedures for auctions,
negotiation and voting have been extensively studied. Such work provides a good
model for the more rigorous investigation of models of legal procedure. Fully
formalising procedures in action languages (as in e.g. [6]) provides an example of
how legal procedures for dispute resolution might be modelled in a way more
amenable to formal investigation of their properties. (Of course, all this also applies to
the above-discussed more specific legal and organisational procedures.)
Rational behaviour within disputes
Since legal reasoning often occurs in procedural settings and the aim of reasoning
within a procedure is to persuade the other participants, the principles of legal
reasoning include interactive strategies as an important element. Hardly any work has
been done so far in AI and Law on persuasive dialogue strategies (one exception
applying game theory is [41]) and so there are good opportunities to apply techniques
from game theory and other relevant fields.
6 Conclusion
We have argued that there is ample opportunity to apply techniques from
computational logic to the law, and we have discussed a number of particular such
opportunities. The list of topics we gave above, however, is by no means intended to
be exhaustive. There are many other topics in logic and AI which could make a
contribution to AI and Law. One attraction that the legal field holds is that it is a rich
source of realistic examples. A real advantage is that the reasoning used in legal
examples is more extensively recorded than in many other fields.
The law is a domain where the cognitive and interactive turns in logic are especially
prevalent. The application of logic to law should therefore provide mutual benefits:
insight into legal reasoning and how to make it computational, as well as a real and
challenging test bed for logical techniques. We see this corner as an ideal venue for
this interchange.
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